IRANO-AFGHAN DISPUTE OVER
Afghanistan over its share in the waters of the Helmand River seems fairly well defined and is less tempestuous than the complicated land and water frontier problem with Iraq. It is beyond the scope of the present study to offer a comparative analysis of either the dimensions of the two problems or the style of the Iranian approach. The purpose is merely to examine the various facets of the Irano-Afghan problem and assess the approaches of the two countries, as also the impact of the problem on the prospects of bilateral and regional peace and stability. 358 neering influence of the Europeans; a projection of the tensions of the SuperPower Cold War of the period since the Second World War; and the use of multilateral and bilateral approaches to settle inter-state disputes. Besides, the problem also provides an example of the processes in which the practical aspects of the efforts to promote regional co-operation, the subordination of political considerations to economic compulsions and interests, and an embryonic functionalist approach to the task of building abiding relations between states are very much in evidence.
At the outset, the constituent elements and outlines of the problem may be presented. Historically, the dispute can be related to the evolution of the modern nation state of Afghanistan, which includes a good deal of the territory which, in ancient times, according to the Iranians, formed part of the Iranian Empire. It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to go into the complex and controversial history of it all. Our concern here is with the specific area of the 
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The treaty contained ten Articles: two protocols related to Articles VII and VIII.
According to Article I, the volume of water from the Helmand River to be released by Afghanistan in a normal year was restricted to an avera.ge flow of 22 cubic metres per second. This was in accordance with the recommendation of the tripartite Neutral Commission. But Article II made an improvement when it specified the volume of water to be received by Iran during each month of the year, ranging from 2.32 cubic metres per second in the dry months to 78.16 cubic metres during the flood period. Article III laid down that in the event of a fall in the flow of water due to climatic factors the volume of water could be reduced on a proportionate basis. Under Article IV, Afghanistan agreed not to take any action which might deprive Iran totally or partially of its agreed share of water, and it retained all rights to the balance of the river water. Iran undertook not to lay claim to the Helmand waters in excess of the specified volume, even if additional water might be available in the Helmand lower delta. Article V obliged Afghanistan to take no action to make the water to be delivered to Iran totally unsuitable for agriculture or to cause it to be polluted. Article VI stipulated that any type of joint structures which were necessary for the purpose of stabilization of the bed of the Helmand River at places where the boundary-line was located at the bed of the river, could be constructed only after the plans and specifications for such structures had been approved by both the parties. Article VII provided that either party could appoint its Commissioners to supervise implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Article VIII stated that in the event of differences in the interpretation or application of the provisions of the treaty, the parties were first to endeavour to obtain a solution through diplomatic negotiations or use of the good offices of a third party, but if neither course produced a solution, the differences were to be submitted for arbitration. Under Article IX, it was agreed that the treaty represented &dquo;the complete and permanent agreement of the two countries, and that it was not to be subjected to any other present or future principle or precedent&dquo;. Article X envisaged that if, because of extreme drought or force majeure, the flow of water to the Helmand delta was made temporarily impossible, the Commissioners of the two countries would enter into immediate consultations with a view to formulating a plan for &dquo;minimizing the emergency of their respective governments&dquo;. The first protocol provided for the constitution, terms of reference, and functions of the Water Commission, and the second contained the agreed details about the manner of resolving the differences and the conditions and composition of the Arbitral Tribunal.
The treaty represented a bilateral and balanced approach to tackle the problem of sharing the water of lower Helmand. It also provided for a built-in mechanism for resolving differences. What in the past decades was regulated only by the uncertain yardstick of tradition and local usage was now given a firm foundation in a formal understanding. 
